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Abstract
In the real world two classes of market designs are implemented to trade electric-
ity in transmission constrained networks. Analytical results show that in two node
networks integrated market designs reduce the ability of electricity generators to
exercise market power relative to separated market designs. In multi node networks
countervailing effects make an analytic analysis difficult.
We present a formulation of both market designs as an equilibrium problem with
equilibrium constraints. We find that in a realistic network, prices are lower with
the integrated market design.
1 Introduction
If electricity is traded in areas with significant transmission constraints, then two basic
design options may be used. First, in the nodal pricing approach or integrated market
design, a centralized system operator collects location-specific energy bids and then clears
the market for the entire region according to a well defined protocol. Such a design, as
implemented for example in New England and PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey Mary-
land and neighbouring states), ensures that different locational markets are automatically
arbitraged and the network is used efficiently.
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This design is mainly criticized for requiring a large degree of co-ordination. The degree of
co-ordination can be reduced at the expense of efficiency if individual nodes are aggregated
into zones, as in the Nordic countries referred to as market splitting or zonal pricing. The
second basic approach to deal with significant transmission constraints are physical rights,
which implies a separate market for transmission and energy. Physical transmission rights
are defined between areas and traders must own the these rights to trade and transmit
energy between areas. If a transmission networks is meshed, such that more than one
path exists between two nodes in the network, then it exhibits the physical phenomena of
loop flows. In the presence of loop flows transmission rights should be allocated centrally,
to ensure that they are mutually compatible. Decentralized allocation of such rights
either must be excessively conservative (which will make inefficient use of the system),
as currently experienced in continental Europe, or must create opportunities to game the
system, as experienced in the California crisis.
In a competitive market without uncertainty, the integrated market approach will result
in the same generation dispatch and prices as an approach based on centrally- allocated
physical transmission rights. This follows because Bohn, Caramanis and Schweppe (1983)
showed that the methodology underlying integrated market prices (nodal prices) results in
welfare maximizing dispatch, and Chao and Peck (1996) proved that the physical-rights-
based approach also results in welfare maximizing dispatch in a situation of competition
and no uncertainty provided that the welfare problems are identical and have a unique
solution.
Harvey, Hogan and Pope (1996) suggested that the separated market design will exhibit
inefficiencies when there is uncertainty, which can be empirically shown by the example
of the German-Dutch interconnector (see Neuhoff 2003).
These claims to efficiency require that generators bid competitively (at short-run marginal
costs), but in a privatised industry this is not guaranteed, particular given current levels
of concentration.
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The aim of this paper is to assess which market design performs better in the context of
market power by generators.
Like all models we have to abstract from certain features of the real market designs to
allow for the implementation. For example, New York and New England have an integrated
energy and transmission market that also includes marginal loss calculations. Furthermore,
they have like PJM a multi-settlement system with integrated day-ahead and balancing
market. The possibility to implement these additional features in a consistent way can be
seen as an additional benefit of an integrated market design, particularly because failure
of a consistent treatment of day ahead and balancing market was one of the critical issues
in California. However, we believe that abstracting from these effects is feasible in first
order, but are excited to see and are working on expanding the analysis to include question
of balancing markets, transmission contracts and forward contracting (see e.g. Kamat and
Oren 2003).
Analytical models show that in a two-node network and in meshed networks with market
power at one node, integrating energy and transmission markets reduces prices and im-
proves welfare. This can be explained by two effects. First, if transmission markets are
separated from energy markets, the allocation of transmission capacity in the network to
export to or import from specific regions is determined before the stage of the energy spot
market. The bids of generators to energy spot markets change the allocated transmission
capacity only in expectation, not in realization. Net-imports are less responsive to out-
put changes of generators, net demand elasticity is reduced and generators exercise more
market power.
Second, if traders arbitrage the different energy markets after obtaining the physical trans-
mission rights, they still have the option to only use a fraction of these rights. However,
they must commit themselves to a certain quantity when they submit bids to the energy
spot markets of the two regions they wish to arbitrage. As electricity can not be stored,
the traders must submit a balanced schedule to the system operator, and therefore they
3
must make sure that they buy the same amount of electricity in one market that they sell
in the other market. In continental Europe, the energy spot markets are auctions which
clear virtually simultaneously; and so traders cannot condition their bid in one market on
the outcome of the other market. As a result, traders must submit a very high- priced buy
bid and a very low- priced sell bid in the respective markets to ensure that both bids will
be accepted. Subsequently, the traders are only obliged to pay the market clearing price,
but the effect is that the amount of energy transmitted is not conditional on the prices in
the energy spot markets. Therefore, generators are not exposed to price responsiveness in
transmitted energy.
However, these general analytical results are hard to generalize to market power at more
than two nodes of a complex network, nor to generators which own assets at more than one
node of the network. For example, in the integrated market design, an increase of output by
a generator at node A could also decrease the prices and therefore revenues of this generator
at node B (Cardell, Hitt and Hogan 1997). This implies that the integrated market design
also provides incentives for generators to reduce output relative to a separated market
design.
To assess the relative importance of these effects, we decided to implement a numerical
model for a realistic network configuration. We chose the Benelux countries Belgium and
the Netherlands, with a reduced representation of the neighbouring states, Germany and
France.
This paper presents a numerical implementation of the integrated market design. We also
give a representation of the separated market design that deviates from previous models in
that it includes net-demand elasticity of the competitive fringe. This allows for comparison
of the results for both market designs.
Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2003) show that endogenous and exogenous arbitrage, which
corresponds to integrated and separated markets, are equivalent under an tacit assump-
tion: strategic generators assume that transmission prices - defined as the price differences
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between different nodes - do not change in response to their output decision. This assump-
tion might be appropriate to represent a situation where strategic generators have limited
information, but frequently large generators are perceived as well-informed. The effect of
the assumption of constant transmission prices is, that generators decide on their profit
maximising output quantity in the believe that their output increase in any one zone
leads to increased exports to all other zones. They assume that they face the demand
responsiveness of the entire network, and will therefore exercise less market power than
if they are aware of transmission constraints. This model approach therefore understates
the exercise of market power in separated energy and transmission markets.
In our numerical results the prices in the integrated market design were always lower than
in the separated market design. The benefit of importing demand elasticity outweighs the
disadvantages due to cross-holding.
This market model is of interest from two different perspectives: From the economic per-
spective regulators are interested in the optimal choice of market design. The ranking with
regard to the behaviour in the presence of market power provides an argument in favor of
the integrated market design. From the mathematical perspective, the integrated market
design is an instance of an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC)
which is a recent field of research.
Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2000) presented a multi- leader/-follower market model in
accordance with Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997). They calculate oligopolistic price equi-
libria for generalized DC networks, using the supply functions of conjectural variation.
Strategic generators can decide either on slope or intersect of their bid functions for each
location. The optimization problem for each generator is a two- stage game, in which
the generator anticipates the transmission allocation and market clearing by the Indepen-
dent System Operator’s (ISO). The problems which result for each player are of the MPEC
type (Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints) and are therefore non-convex
and non-differentiable. The authors search for an equilibrium by solving the generators’
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problems sequentially, using the last bid of the competitors as the input parameter.
Also related to the topic of this paper is the debate of nodal versus zonal pricing. In
both separated energy and transmission markets and integrated markets, the aggregation
of individual nodes to zones either requires a more conservative definition of transmission
capacity or increases the opportunity for generators to exercise market power (Harvey and
Hogan 2000); aggregation results in inefficient dispatch and causes generators to make
incorrect location decisions. The comparison of integrated and separated markets in this
paper is based on the same level of aggregation in both designs. For the integrated energy
and transmission markets, a shift to smaller zones or nodes is feasible, while a design with
separate energy and transmission rights would loose liquidity at each node and would re-
quire increasing complexity in transmission contracts.
The paper is structured as follows: In section two we use a three-node network to ana-
lytically determine the market equilibrium in both designs and to provide the intuition
for some of the differences. In section three we provide general formulations for the inte-
grated and section four for the separated market design as an equilibrium problem with
equilibrium constraints. In section five we use a realistic network of the Benelux countries
to compare the market designs and we conclude in section six.
6
2 A three node network
To provide an intuition of how the two discussed market designs affect the behaviour of
the strategic generators, we start with the a simple network as frequently used in the
literature.
3
1
2
K=5
Competitive D
Monopoly G
Competitive 
(exporting)
Competitive 
(importing)
Figure 1: Three node network
In this three- node network only the transmission line between node 1 and 3 is constrained
and of capacity K. Defining node 3 as the swing bus, we must determine the fraction γi
(the power distribution factors) of flows from node 1 and 2 that crosses the constrained link
13. According to Kirchhof’s laws, flows are split between all feasible paths proportional
to the inverse of the resistance on these paths. For energy delivery from node 1 to node 3
the direct link has half the distance of the path via node 2. Therefore physical laws imply
that two thirds of the energy pass along the direct path. The power distribution factor
for exports t1 from node 1 to node 3 cross link 13 is γ1 =
2
3
. According to the same logic,
γ2 =
1
3
of exports t2 from node 2 to node 3 cross link 13.
We assume markets at node 1 and 3 and demand at node 2 are competitive. Net production
at each node I is qi and positive for exports and negative for imports. The net-demand
curve is assumed to be linear:
pi = −ai − biqi. (1)
One strategic generator with output s2 is located at node 2 and is assumed to have no
variable costs of production.
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In the first market design energy and transmission markets are separated. The trans-
mission quantities are determined in the transmission auction which precedes the energy
spot markets. Therefore generators choose which output quantities to bid into the energy
spot market assuming fixed amounts of transmitted energy. In the second market design
energy and transmission markets are integrated. The strategic generator knows that his
output decisions will influence the allocation of transmission rights by the SO. This is
represented by a Stackelberg model, where the strategic generator(s) are the Stackelberg
leader which anticipate the reaction of the follower (- the system operator) - to their output
choices. This problem will be later formulated as EPEC. The leaders (generators) include
the optimality condition and constraints of the follower (system operator) into their profit
function
2.1 Separated Market design
In the separate market design traders bid in the transmission auction. The system operator
allocates transmission rights to make most efficient use of the network. Traders then use
their transmission rights to arbitrage energy spot markets. Chao and Peck(1996) show
that this design results in a welfare optimal allocation in a competitive setting. Therefore
we can also represent it using a single welfare maximising function for the auctioneer. If a
strategic generator decides how much energy to offer in the energy spot market, then the
strategic generator influences net demand at his production node. In a world of complete
information traders correctly anticipate the output decision of the strategic generator.
They act as if demand at the corresponding node is reduced by the output quantity which
will be offered by the strategic generator.
The auctioneer maximizes residual welfare, taken the Cournot bids of strategic generators
as fixed (see also Smeers and Wei, 1999):
Wr = max
qi,ti
∑
i
bi
2
q2i + aiqi. (2)
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The maximizsation is subject the network energy balance:
∑
i
ti = 0, (3)
local energy balance:
qi + si = ti, (4)
and transmission constraint:
γ1t1 + γ2t2 ≤ K. (5)
For simplicity, we assume that the transmission constraint is binding so we can use the
equality sign in (5). We also assume that capacity and non-negativity constraints are
satisfied. Using (4) to eliminate ti in (3) and (5) q1 and q3 can be written as function of
q2:
q1 =
K − γ2 (q2 + s2)
γ1
,
q3 =
−K + (γ2 − γ1) (q2 + s2)
γ1
,
allowing us to express the optimization problem (2) as a function of the remaining choice
variable q2. To simplify the calculations we subsequently set parameter values a1 = b3 = 0
(note that all the ai and bi are negative):
Wr = max
q2
b1
2
(
K − γ2 (q2 + s2)
γ1
)
2
+ a2q2 +
b2
2
q2
2
+ a3
−K + (γ2 − γ1) (q2 + s2)
γ1
.
This is a concave function in q2 with a unique maximum. The FOC gives the optimal
competitive output choice:
q2 =
γ2b1K − γ
2
2
b1s2 − γ
2
1
a2 − a3 (γ1γ2 − γ
2
1
)
γ22b1 + γ
2
1b2
.
The system operator uses (4) to determine how much transmission capacity to allocate to
the different links:
t2 = s2 + q2 =
γ2b1K + γ
2
1
b2s2 − γ
2
1
a2 − a3 (γ1γ2 − γ
2
1
)
γ22b1 + γ
2
1b2
. (6)
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The strategic generator at node 2 takes the ti as given in his optimisation decision. His
maximization problem is:
Π = max
s2,q2,p2
p2s2, (7)
subject to the local energy balance (4) and the competitive bids of local net demand (1).
The two constraints allow the expression of the two choice variables q2 and p2 as a function
of s2, such that the optimisation problem reads:
Π = max
s2
(b2 (s2 − t2)− a2) s2, (8)
and is solved:
s2 =
a2
2b2
+
t2
2
. (9)
In equilibrium, traders correctly anticipate the output choice s2 of the strategic generator
when bidding in the transmission auction. Otherwise, there would either be an profitable
opportunity for a new entrant or existing traders would leave the market due to losses.
Therefore, also the welfare maximising system operator, which is equivalent to the com-
petitive traders, correctly anticipates the output decision of the strategic generator when
determining the allocation of export rights t2. This implies that (6) and (9) have to be
simultaneously satisfied. This gives us the equilibrium output quantity of our generator1 :
s2 =
γ2b1K + γ
2
2
b1
b2
a2 − (γ1γ2 − γ
2
1
) a3
2γ22b1 + γ
2
1b2
. (10)
2.2 Integrated energy and transmission Markets
In the Stackelberg game, the leader (generator) continues to maximize his profit function
(8) subject to local energy balance (4) and competitive local demand response (1). The
1Substituting parameter values for demand a1 = 0, b1 = −2, a2 = −8, b2 = −1, a3 = −10, b3 = 0 and
network K = 5, γ1 =
2
3
, γ2 =
1
3
gives the following equilibrium prices and quantities:
s2 = 8.25, q1 = 3.25, q2 = .25, q3 = −11.75,
p1 = 6.5, p2 = 8.25, p3 = 10.
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difference is that t2 is no longer fixed but determined by the follower (system operator) as
a function of the strategic output choice of the generator s2.
We have already solved the followers’ reaction function t2(s2) and determined the optimal
allocation of transmission rights as a function of s2 in equation (6). Therefore, we need
only substitute t2(s2) for t2 in the profit function of the strategic generator (8):
Π = max
s2
(
b2
(
s2 −
γ2b1K + γ
2
1
b2s2 − γ
2
1
a2 − a3 (γ1γ2 − γ
2
1
)
γ22b1 + γ
2
1b2
)
− a2
)
s2, (11)
and calculate the FOC to obtain the optimal output choice s2 :
s2 =
γ2b1Kγ
2
2
+ b1
b2
a2 − (γ1γ2 − γ
2
1
) a3
2γ22b1
. (12)
The nominator in (12) and (10) is identical, but the denominator is larger in (10).2 This
shows that the production of the strategic generator is larger in the integrated market
design. The intuition behind this result is, that the generator no longer faces only local
demand response, but also the response of the network. To calculate this demand slope,
we differentiate the price at node 2, as expressed in the parentheses of equation (11), with
respect to the output choice s2 of the strategic generators:
−
∂p2
∂s2
|integrated = −b2
1
1 +
b2γ
2
1
b1γ
2
2
< −b2 = −
∂p2
∂s2
|separated.
Provided b1, b2 < 0. Integrating the energy and transmission markets implies that prices
are changing less with output changes, or that effective demand is more responsive to price
changes. Higher effective demand elasticity is the main driver in mitigating market power
and can be obtained at low costs by choosing the appropriate integrated market design.
2The previous parameter values give the following equilibrium prices:
s2 = 16.5, q1 = 0.5, q2 = −2.5, q3 = −14.5,
p1 = 1, p2 = 5.5, p3 = 10.
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3 Formulation of the Integrated Market as an Equi-
librium Problem
The integrated market design corresponds to a two- stage game, in which the strategic
generators submit quantity bids to an ISO. They anticipate the allocation of transmission
capacity by the ISO in their optimisation problem. The usual method prescribed for the
ISO is to assume that bids of the generators and demand side are competitive and to clear
the market such that social welfare is maximised. The demand and competitive fringe
bids at marginal cost into the energy market. We start with the stationarity conditions of
the ISO, followed by the optimisation problems of the strategic generators. We conclude
with a discussion of the solution algorithm.
Strategic generators 
System operator
Figure 2: Integrated Market Design
3.1 Formulation of the Follower’s problem (ISO)
We will use the following notation for the description of the problem. The network has I
nodes i with M links m between these nodes. We model J strategic generation companies
j, which can control generation on one or several nodes of the network. To allow for
piecewise linear marginal cost schemes, we split the schemes in L sections l with linear
cost segments.
In our formulation of the cost function c(q) = maxl{cal + cblq}, q ≤ q
max we use L
12
Quantity 
C
o
s
t
c (q)=max{a + b q}
k k k
q
Figure 3: Cost Curves
variables ql with c(q1, . . . , qL) =
∑
l cal + cblql, q
max
l−1 ≤ ql ≤ q
max
l where q
max
L = q
max.
Likewise, to represent piecewise linear cost schemes for competitive generation, their cost
curves are split into K− 1 linear sections k = 2, . . . , K. The linear demand curve for each
node is included as a negative competitive supply curve and is denoted by k = 1. The
quantities of the demand and the competitive fringe are therefore qk with c(q1, . . . , qK) =∑
l ak + bkqk, q
max
k−1 ≤ qk ≤ q
max
k where q
max
K = q
max and a1 and b1 are the parameters of
the linear demand function and negative.
The exogenous parameters are denoted as:
caijl cost curve intercept, node i, strategic generator j, section l
cbijl cost curve slope, node i, strategic generator j, section l
capgik capacity limit fringe generator node i
capgijl capacity limit generator j, node i, section l
aik bid curve intercept, node i, fringe generator and demand
bik bid curve slope, node i, fringe generator and demand
γi,m % flow from node i over link m to swing bus (node 1)
capkm capacity link m
σk σ1 = 1 and σk = −1 for k 6= 1 for the different
treatment of demand and competitive fringe.
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And the variables are:
si,j,l quantities strategic generator j, node i, section l
qi,j,k quantitiy, consumer or fringe generator, node i.
In the separated market design we have additionally:
ti export quantity, node i
The ISO’s objective is to allocate transmission capacity, such that the network is optimally
used. This can be achieved by maximizing social welfare. For discussion of this topic,
see Smeers and Wei (1999). The optimization problem of the ISO contains the energy
conservation constraint, the capacity constraints of the transmission lines and the capacity
constraints for the competitive fringe:
maxqik
∑
i qik(aik +
bik
2
qik)
s.t.
∑
i
(∑
j sij + qik
)
= 0 p1
−capkm ≤
∑
i γm,i
(∑
j sijl +
∑
k qik
)
≤ capkm ρm, δm
0 ≥ σkqik ≥ σkcapgik λik, µik
This is a quadratic optimization problem with a unique solution.
The KKT-stationarity conditions of the ISO’s optimization problem are:
(aik + bikqik) + p1 −
∑
m ρmγm,i +
∑
m δmγmi + σkλik − σkµik = 0∑
i(
∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qik) = 0
0 ≥ −Capkm −
∑
i γm,i
(∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qik
)
⊥ρm ≥ 0
0 ≥
(∑
i γm,i
(∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qi
))
− Capkm⊥δm ≥ 0
σkqi,k ≥ 0
λik ≥ 0
qikλik = 0
−σkqikqik + σkcapgik ≥ 0
µik ≥ 0
(−σkqikqik + σkcapgik)µik = 0
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3.2 Formulation of Leader’s problem (Generator)
In the leader problem for the strategic generators, the quantity bids of their fellow strategic
generators are taken as constant. Leaders anticipate the ISO response to their quantity
bid. This is modelled by including the optimality conditions of the ISO’s problem as
constraints in the strategic generators’ optimization problem. The strategic generators
maximize profits. Profits consist of electricity sales at the nodes of production minus pro-
duction costs. The first ten constraints are the KKT-conditions of the ISO optimization
problem; the remaining two constraints are the non-negativity and capacity constraints of
production.
maxsijl,qik,p1,ρm,δm,λik,µik
[∑
i
(
(p1 +
∑
m γi,m (−ρm + δm))
∑
l sijl −
∑
l
(
caijl +
1
2
cbijlsijl
)
sijl
)]
s.t (aik + bikqik) + p1 −
∑
m ρmγm,i +
∑
m δmγmi + σkλik − σkµik = 0∑
i(
∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qik) = 0
0 ≥ −Capkm −
∑
i γm,i
(∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qik
)
⊥ρm ≥ 0
0 ≥
(∑
i γm,i
(∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qi
))
− Capkm⊥δm ≥ 0
σkqi,k ≥ 0
λik ≥ 0
qikλik = 0
−σkqik + σkcapgik ≥ 0
µik ≥ 0
(−σkqik + σkcapgik)µik = 0
sijl ≥ 0
sijl ≤ capgijl
Note that electricity prices are calculated as nodal prices where the multiplier p1 of the
energy conservation constraint determines the price at the swing bus.
For the leader j, the optimization problem is a MPEC. MPECs are nonconvex and nondif-
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ferentiable optimization problems, and are therefore difficult to solve. For further details,
see Luo et al. (1996).
3.3 Properties of EPECs
The integrated energy and transmission market and also the later described separated
market design lead to Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints, which are a
special case of a generalized Nash game (GN)in which all leaders share the same comple-
mentarity constraints. Harker (1991) and Ehrenmann (2003) showed that GN-games can
have non-isolated, multiple solutions. Oren (1997) showed that pure strategy solution do
not necessarily exist. Possibly only mixed strategy equilibria exist. They are difficult to
calculate in such complex games, but have been calculated for a simple network, e.g. by
Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000).
Hu and Ralph (2001) gave an example for the non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium
in in a three node network.
We followed the digitalisation approach of Hobbs, Metzler and Pang (2000) to solve the
optimisation problem of each generator sequentially. In the separate market design the
coordinated auction is a further step of the sequential optimisation. This equal represen-
tation is possible even so the coordinated auction precedes the output decisions of the
generators. From the perspective of generators in the energy market both representations
are identical as they take the bids of traders as given in the Nash representation of the one
stage game as if they would have occurred in a preceding time step. From the perspective
of traders in the transmission auction both representations are identically if the traders
are competitive. They do not bid strategically in the transmission auction, therefore this
causality can be ignored.
We implemented the different market designs in the modelling package GAMS and solved
the MPECs via a vanilla SQP method (see Fletcher, Leyffer, Ralph and Scholtes). In
our experiments, the sequence generated by a diagonalization converged for both market
16
designs.
4 Formulation Separated Market
Figure 4: Separated Market Design
In the separated market design, the strategic generators do not anticipate a reaction in the
volumes of transmission in response to their quantity bids, since the transmission auction
takes place as a coordinated auction before generators submit their quantity bids.
Individual competitive arbitrageurs will not influence the market results and therefore only
look at the price levels, not at the price changes they are able to induce. They are not
interested in the reaction of generators to their arbitrage decisions as long as they make
zero losses in equilibrium.
Marginal revenues by definition internalize the effect of output changes on price levels.
Therefore, in the separated market design, we can treat the Cournot game between the
strategic generators and the coordinated auction as ’on the same level’. Due to the capac-
ity constraints on the competitive generators, the net demand (which is demand minus
competitive generation) is not differentiable in the points at which the capacity or non-
negativity constraints become active. In the mathematical formulation, this is represented
by mixed complementarity constraints. The resulting optimization problems are again of
17
MPEC type. Furthermore, the non-negativity constraints of competitive generation im-
ply that the net demand functions are not necessarily convex, and so the solution, is not
necessarily unique.
This problem of non-concavity can be avoided by assuming that the competitive generators
submit bids that are not responsive to price changes. Then the competitive generators’
output decision can be modelled on the same level as the strategic generators’ output
decision and the allocation of transmission capacity in the coordinated auction (Hobbs
2001). This approach is likely to understate the effect of the net demand responsiveness
provided by competitive generation.
As the strategic generators take the allocation of the transmission rights ti as given, they
no longer optimize over the shadow price of transmission constraints (ρ, δ). Instead, we
introduce local spot prices pi.
The optimization problem of generator j then becomes:
max
pijl,qik,pi,λik,γik
∑
i
∑
l
(pisijl)−
∑
i
∑
l
(caijl +
1
2
cbijlsijl)sijl
s.t. aik + bikqik + pi + σkλik − σkµik = 0∑
l,j si,j,l +
∑
k qik − ti = 0
σkqik ≥ 0
λik ≥ 0
qi,kλik = 0
−σkqik + σkcapdik ≥ 0
µik ≥ 0
µik(−σkqik + σkCapdik) = 0
sijl ≥ 0
−sijl + capgijl ≥ 0
The coordinated auction determines the export quantity ti in order to maximise social
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welfare:
max
t,qi,pi
∑
i,k
−σk
(
ai,k +
1
2
bi,kqik
)
qik,
subject to the energy balance (line 1) in the network and (line 2) at each individual node.
Constraints (line 3) are the market clearing condition for competitive generation and
demand with the (line 4-6) non-negativity and (line 7-9) capacity constraints. Constraints
(line 10-11) are the upper- and lower- line capacity constraints.
s.t.
∑
i ti = 0∑
j,l sijl +
∑
k qik − ti = 0
aik + bikqik + pi + σkλik − σkµik = 0
σkqik ≥ 0
λik ≥ 0
qi,kλik = 0
−σkqik + σkcapdik ≥ 0
µik ≥ 0
µik(−σkqik + σkCapdik) = 0
Capkm −
∑
i γm,iti ≥ 0∑
i γm,iti + Capkm ≥ 0
The resulting problem is of the EPEC type since the ISO and the strategic generators share
the market clearing conditions of demand and competitive fringe as common constraints.
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5 Numerical findings for a realistic network
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Figure 5: Network
The network consists of three nodes in the Netherlands, two nodes in Belgium and one
node each in Germany and France with generation and demand. Further intermediate
nodes without demand or generation are used to model the linearised DC network. The
transmission constraints were summarized as 28 flow-gates. All flow-gates are character-
ized by an upper limit in MWh, and by power distribution functions characterizing the
amount of energy transmitted to each node from the reference node Germany, passing via
the flow-gate.
For the generation capacity, the following eight firms were considered as strategic gen-
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erators, with production in one or several countries. Production in Belgium and the
Netherlands is divided between the two or respectively three nodes in each country, ac-
cording to the location of the generation plants. In Germany and France, production and
demand are located at the national nodes D and F.
Germany EOn, ENBW, RWE, Vattenfall, EdF
France EdF, ENBW
Belgium Electrabel
Netherlands Essent, Nuon, E.ON, Electrabel
We assume that all these firms are bidding their entire output in the spot market with
the sole objective to maximise profit. This assumption does not correspond to reality for
two reasons. First, monopolists like EDF face the threat of regulatory intervention if they
charge excessive prices and will therefore moderate their behaviour. Secondly, electricity
generators sign long-term contracts, either in the form of explicit contracts with large
customers or implicit contracts due to their vertical integration with the supply business.
Due to these long-term contracts the exposure to the spot market is reduced and strategic
generators face less incentive to exercise market power (Allaz and Vila 1993). Nevertheless,
we think the results of our analysis are relevant, because the focus of our analysis is the
comparison of two market designs and not the determination of absolute price levels. The
remaining generation plants, which are not allocated to one of the mentioned companies,
are assumed to bid their marginal cost curves into the spot market.
Variable cost of the generation plants is represented using a two-piece linear cost curve.
To create several different demand scenarios, the empirical load data for the summer
and winter super peak are used and scaled with a scenario and location- specific random
factor. With this method we created ten different demand scenarios, of which five are for
a summer and five for a winter generation structure. Figure 6 shows the demand levels at
30 Euro/MWh. We assume that demand is linear. To determine the slope we assume that
demand elasticity is 0.1 at the previously calculated demand for a price of 30 Euro/MWh.
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With these parameter values we solve the equilibrium problems described in section three.
For the integrated market design we solved iteratively the optimisation problems of the
strategic individual generators with respect to the stationarity conditions of the ISO.
Strategic generators are Stackelberg leaders with respect to the ISO, therefore their op-
timisation problem is constrained by complementarity conditions describing the station-
arity conditions of the ISO. We use a NLP reformulation, suggested by Fletcher, Leyffer,
Scholtes and Ralph (2002) in which we replace the complementarity 0 ≤ f(z)⊥g(z) ≥ 0
by f(z) > 0, g(z) ≥ 0, f(z)⊤g(z) ≤ 0.
We use SNOPT SQP to solve the equilibrium problems. Figure 7 illustrates that the
diagonalisation converges after very few iteration. However we expect, but so far did not
observe, that changes in the starting values might lead to convergence against different
equilibria.
The representation of the separated market design differs in two aspects. First, the ISO
does not allocate transmission in reaction to the output decision of strategic generators,
but before the spot market. This timing would suggest that he should now be modelled as
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Figure 6: Load Scenarios
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a leader. However, as the ISO does not act strategically he can be modelled at the same
stage as strategic generators. We iterate the optimisation over all strategic generators and
the ISO. Secondly, competitive fringe generators continue to submit bids conditional on
the equilibrium price. They are modelled as followers in the optimisation problem and we
therefore still have to solve a two-stage game.
The numeric results for the separated energy and market design are represented in Figure
8. The prices calculated for France are higher than in the other zones, which is due to EdF’s
monopoly position and binding import constraints from both Germany and Belgium. As
discussed above, we did not model that in reality a dominant national generator could not
increase the price to the calculated level without triggering strong regulatory interference.
By contrast, Germany has the lowest price levels, since it has four strategic generators and
a large share of competitive generation that provides a large responsiveness in net demand.
The relative prices in the integrated market look similar, also here France exhibits the
highest prices.
Figure 9 shows the price change when shifting from the separated to the integrated market
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design. In our examples prices are always higher in a separated market design. The lowest
impact of integrating energy and transmission market is on price levels in France because
transmission constraints are binding from both neighbouring countries represented in our
model, Germany and Belgium. The flexibility of allocating transmission capacity provided
by the integrated market design only allows limited readjustment and therefore only little
additional demand responsiveness. By contrast, the nodes in the Benelux countries have
large price changes because they are located in the middle of a meshed network.
Note, that the Netherlands are represented as three separate zones and in the separated
market approach generators compete in small markets. In the integrated market approach
a higher zonal resolution does not exclude competition with generators in neighbouring
zones.
1
4
7
10
D F
G
R
A
M
K
R
IM
M
A
A
S
M
E
R
C
Z
W
O
L
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Scenario
Node
Figure 8: Price levels in Euro
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6 Conclusions
Two types of market design exist for the allocation of transmission capacity in meshed
electricity networks. In the separated energy and transmission market, physical transmis-
sion rights are allocated in a coordinated auction. Trading electric energy between regions
requires the ownership of transmission rights.
In the integrated energy and transmission market, energy is traded locally and a system
operator schedules energy flows between regions. Financial transmission contracts facili-
tate trading between regions.
In competitive markets without uncertainty, both designs produce identical market out-
comes. If generators act strategically, integrating energy and transmission markets effec-
tively induces demand elasticity. This should reduce the ability of strategic generators to
exercise market power, and should therefore reduce prices. However, if companies own
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25
generation facilities at several nodes, integration also provides an incentive to increase the
exercise of market power. The balance of these effects could not be determined analytically
for realistic networks. We therefore implemented the two market designs as an Equilib-
rium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints in the modelling package GAMS. We applied
our models to data representing the Benelux situation. Comparing the resulting prices, we
observed that the ability of the integrated market design to ’import net demand elasticity’
dominates and that prices were always lower in our test scenarios in the integrated market
design. So far we have only ensured that bidding strategies of generators are stationary
points, but have not examined whether finite deviations are profitable.
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